Abstract: On a widely held view, the canonical way to make sense of intentional actions, is to invoke the agent's 'motivating reasons', where the claim that X did A for some 'motivating reason' is taken to be neutral on whether X had a normative reason to do A. In this paper I explore a challenge to this view, drawing on Anscombe's 'second-personal' approach to the nature of action explanation.
failing to act in that way would be wrong. Furthermore, the notion of justification might lead one to think that the agent is asked to justify her activity to the questioner, where this would mean the latter must have the requisite authority to challenge the agent and hold her responsible. This is a familiar theme in recent work in moral philosophy on the 'second-person perspective' and its role in our thinking about certain kinds of moral reasons. (Darwall 2006) Neither of the two associations of 'justification' seems to me to be germane to Anscombe's discussion. The kind of practical reason you have (or think you have) when you go upstairs in order to fetch your camera is not typically a consideration that would make it wrong not to go upstairs, as opposed to making it lazy or foolish (or possibly laying you open to no criticism at all). A reason can recommend a certain course of action without making it wrong, absent other justifying reasons, not to take it. 2 Again, in asking 'Why are you going upstairs?' I'm not challenging you to justify your behaviour to me. Perhaps in special circumstances I might (say, if you promised to stay downstairs); but the question is a perfectly intelligible and familiar question to ask even without that special background. It is simply 'What is the point of your going upstairs?'. What's requested is indeed a normative reason, a set of considerations that counts in favour of your going upstairs, but not necessarily a 'justifying' reason in either of the narrower senses.
But this is not the main problem with the proposed analysis. The main problem is that the contemporary theorist appears to miss the point that in Anscombe's examples normative reasons are invoked to explain why the protagonist is doing what she is doing. By the lights of the contemporary theorist, this amounts to a category mistake.
According to a widespread assumption in contemporary work on action explanation, we have two concepts of practical reasons, catering to different kinds of interest: we reflect on normative reasons when interested in deliberative or justificatory questions (What am I to do? What she right to do A?), and we invoke 'motivating reasons' in response to explanatory questions (Why did she to A?). Answering these questions, on what I'll call the 'two-concept view' of practical reasons, are distinct kinds of enterprises. Thus the enterprise of making intentional actions rationally intelligible is seen as insulated from the rough-and-tumble of debates about normative reasons.
My aim in what follows is to bring out the force of Anscombe's challenge to this picture. We can think of the challenge as falling into two parts. First, reflection on the second-person question 'Why?' suggest that the two-concept view distorts the way we ordinarily think about intentional actions: it represents us as occupying a more detached perspective on action explanation than is compatible with our role as deliberators and interlocutors. The second part of the challenge maintains that the two-concept view distorts what it means to act intentionally. Understanding intentional action requires understanding the kind of the explanation requested by
Anscombe's second-person question 'Why?' -construed in the commonsensical, 'argumentative' way made vivid by her examples. I begin with a more detailed exposition of the two-concept view. In section 2, I discuss the first part of the challenge. In section 3, I turn to the second part, enlisting the support of recent work on a 'disjunctive' conception of reason-giving explanation.
The two-concept view
The basic observation from which the two-concept view develops is that we seem to be able to make actions rationally intelligible even if the agent is mistaken about her normative reasons. The way the point tends to be put is that 'the agent's reason' for (say) drinking the content of the bottle (in Williams's example) was that he believed the bottle contained gin. 
Sharing reasons
It sometimes happens that the reason given by an agent for her current activity is While there is more than one style of answering the latter question, the most basic way to do so is this: we set out the considerations in the light of which our doing A can be seen to be an effective way to promote some (in some way) desirable outcome. gives him a good reason for acting, and (iii) that he is acting because these considerations give him good reason.
It's (c) that implies a challenge to the two-concept view. It suggests that we're ordinarily happy to assign explanatory relevance to normative reasons, as opposed to deploying the 'detached' explanatory schema featuring 'motivating reasons' (conceived as neutral on whether the agent has a normative reason). Accordingly, while two-concept theorists may be more or less sympathetic to (a) and (b), they tend to reject (c). One might wonder whether they are committed to doing so -whether they might not simply acknowledge that our ordinary thinking about intentional actions does not always tally with their austere philosophical theory. I will return to this issue in the next section. In any case, as a matter of fact, two-concept theorists tend not to think of their view as in any way revisionist. They grant that the question 'why?' is often answered by stating non-psychological reason-giving facts rather than citing the relevant 'motivating reason'. But they think that such talk is intended to be taken with a pinch of salt. These suggestions promise to enable us to make sense of (a) and (b) without accepting (c). The idea is that even from the participants' perspectives, it is apparent that the normative question 'What is the point of doing A?' is just an indirect method for getting at the answer to the explanatory question 'Why are you doing A?'.
Answering the former will involve expressing or 'indicating' the non-factive attitudes that in turn provide the explanation demanded by the latter. pass by there is no particular mystery about how that fact can make a difference to his behaviour (no more so, at least, than there is about his capacity to know that she is going to pass by).
Not only is there no incoherence in taking non-psychological reason-giving explanations at face value, it's in fact profoundly natural for us to do so when we are talking about things we are in the process of doing. In such cases, one's relation to the activity is not theoretical but practical. Frequently one still needs to engage in practical reasoning to settle the finer details of how to go on, and quite generally it can still be a practical question whether to carry on at all. The case for (c) turns on the thought that practical reasoning has two aims that are intelligibly and, for the deliberator, essentially connected. One aim is to get right what one has most reason to do. The other aim is to determine or control what one will be (or is) doing. Suppose the starting point for practical reasoning is provided, at least typically or in the basic case, by some more or less determinate end one has in view, such as taking a picture of Marilyn Monroe. The purpose of the reasoning is to help achieve that end by getting right what (else) one needs to do to achieve it. This in turn renders both of the characteristic aims of practical reasoning readily intelligible. If you are to achieve your end you certainly need to get right what course of action will enable you to achieve it; equally the outcome of that reasoning must make a difference to what you will be doing. The two things are evidently connected. What's essential for success in practical reasoning is not just that it should get things right and that it should somehow make a difference to what one will eventually be doing, but that the facts (which one needs to get right) will make a difference to what one will be doing.
These general points suggest it must be mistake to draw a contrast between the standpoints of practical reasoning and explanation. In practical reasoning we assume that our reasoning will make a difference to the action towards which we are reasoning, and this bears on how best to explain what we are or will be doing. 11 I borrow the distinction between the two questions from Hornsby 2011, 119. As Hornsby puts it, the two questions 'go hand in hand.'
To insist that the correct explanation of the agent's doing A lies in her 'motivating reasons' (her non-factive attitudes) would be to sever or at least complicate the link between these questions. One would have to think about one's action from a standpoint that's neutral on whether one is getting things right in one's practical reasoning, for example, whether one is discovering instrumental relations that will facilitate achievement of one's end, or is deluded about them. It may not be impossible for an agent to adopt that kind of perspective even in the midst of deliberating and acting, but doing so would certainly go against the grain. It's hard to stop caring about the distinction between discovery and delusion while being engaged in the project of practical reasoning, the success of which turns on that distinction.
Correlatively, it is natural that when asked why she is doing A, the agent will invite others to share the view that reflects her answer to the question of how best to do B.
I finish this section by trying to allay an interesting worry, to do with the connection between normative reasons and action explanation. The worry, in a word, is that Anscombe's view makes the business of action explanation, even as conducted through second-person interactions, excessively and perhaps insanely demanding.
Accepting the reason given by the agent would, in basic cases, involve accepting that there is some desirable outcome that the action helps to promote. This, you might say, makes explaining what one is doing look too much like trying to get the audience to collaborate. Without pretending to do justice to this large and interesting topic, I
would make two immediate points in response. One is that it's far from implausible that accepting the agent's reason involves some evaluative commitments; the other is that these are fairly minimal. If the photographer's account of his action turns on an objective we don't consider to be in any way desirable (assassinating rather than photographing Marilyn Monroe, say), we wont' be disposed fully to share his reason.
But it is a further question whether the evaluative commitment we incur in accepting someone's reason will have any practical implications for us. We may lack the requisite skills, opportunities, temperament, and so forth, and even if the commitment generates practical reasons for us, these may be defeated by other considerations.
Perhaps we will at least acquire a good reason not to interfere with the agent's activities. But this does not look like an implausibly onerous commitment. 
Disjunctivism
If the discussion of the last section is on the right lines, the two-concept view would seem to misrepresent the way we ordinarily find our own and our interlocutors' intentional actions intelligible. How damaging is this criticism? You might say that the damage would be strictly limited. For we need to distinguish three questions, only the last of which, you might insist, is of any real importance to the two-concept view: and (ii); and that the discussion of the previous section really only speaks to (i).
Yet, if the answer to (i) is affirmative, we'd clearly need a powerful reason to accept a negative answer to (iii). It's agreed on all hands (in the current debate) that explaining an intentional action 'as such' is to understand it as an exercise of practical rationality.
If we find it natural to explain intentional action in terms of normative reasons, recognized as such by the agent, and if, moreover, such explanation are sometimes correct, what's the rationale for denying that they count as seeing an intentional action as a manifestation of practical rationality, hence as finding it intelligible as such?
It might be said that the rationale is not far to seek. As Jonathan Dancy succinctly puts it: 'it is not required for the purpose of explanation that the agent be right about things. ' (2011, 6) It seems right that whenever someone is intentionally doing something it's possible to make her action (more or less) rationally intelligible without taking a view on whether there are adequate normative reasons for which she might be said to act. This is an important point, the significance of which is not always appreciated. George W. Bush, for example, was reported as urging that we should condemn, rather than try to explain, acts of terrorism. Dancy's dictum could be used to remind Bush that the two things are perfectly compatible. But there is an alternative, stronger construal of Dancy's point. He might be interpreted as saying that whether the agent is right about things is a question that is never immediately relevant for the purpose of rational explanation. There may of course be good reasons to take an interest in it. But when we do so in the context of trying to make sense of someone's actions, we are, strictly speaking, conflating two distinct enterprises.
Clearly the weak reading of Dancy's point does not entail the stronger reading. That it's always possible to make rational sense of intentional actions from a detached point of view does not mean this is the only, or always the best, way to do so. But might the plausibility of the weak reading nevertheless provide support for the stronger reading? The weak reading, it might be said, encourages a certain ideal of detachment. A concern with the explanatory role of the normative reasons that give a point to an intentional action is entirely natural in cases where we relate to the action as deliberators (either directly, in the case of our own actions, or indirectly, insofar as the agent shares her reasons with us). But given that it's always possible to find na action intelligible from a detached point of view, we should regard that kind of concern as something parochial or perspectival, to be left behind when we engage in the pure project of making rational sense of intentional actions.
It's a good question how much there is to be said, along these lines, for the ideal of detachment. 13 But there is a background question, whether the explanatory link between non-factive 'rationalizing' attitudes and intentional actions is intelligible on its own. Disjunctivists deny this. On their view, it is not just that there is more than one way to explain intentional actions 'as such', but we must acknowledge what is sometimes called the 'primacy of the good case'. The ability to make sense of actions in terms of non-factive rationalizing attitudes depends on the more basic ability to find actions intelligible as something the agent has a normative reason to do (and is doing for that reason). If disjunctivists are right about this, then realizing the ideal of detachment would deprive us even of the detached mode of understanding that the ideal promotes.
I want to conclude by suggesting a way to understand and defend the disjunctivist insistence on the primacy of the good case. Start from the observation that the explanatory connection between attitudes and actions that we invoke in giving rationalizing explanations is in some ways distinctive. Compare and contrast two cases. Maria is yawning because she is tired. This may be a perfectly good explanation. There does seem to be a causal relationship between fatigue and yawning, or so at least commonsense psychology assumes. Saying this is compatible, though, with acknowledging that commonsense psychology has no insight into the reason why fatigue should give rise to yawning. The matter is opaque to most of us, though of course physiologists have produced theories that may get to the bottom of it. Things are different in the case of rationalizing explanations. Max is proceeding to the kitchen cupboard because he feels it's time for a bite of chocolate and he believes that his chocolate is there. In this case, the explanatory connection between attitudes and action is perspicuous. The reason why the attitudes can be expected to result in the action is transparent to any mature commonsense psychologist: they make it rational or sensible for Max to go to the cupboard (other things being equal At the same time, given his false belief about the whereabouts of his chocolate, he ought to go to the kitchen cupboard, in the 'ought of rationality' sense. In other words, two-concept theorists would need to argue that there is a distinctive and perhaps weak sense in which 'motivating reasons' are normative! This would provide us with a way to find the explanatory role of rationalizing attitudes independently intelligible, with no reliance on what disjunctivists take to be the 'good case'.
I called this task a 'challenge' for two reasons. One is that is has proved to be extremely difficult to provide a philosophical account of the putative normativity of 'rational requirements'. One of the most careful recent attempts to do so, for example, turns out, in the end, to deliver an explanation, not of the 'ought of rationality', but of the (illusory) appearance of an 'ought of rationality'. (Kolodny 2005 ) The second reason is this. Suppose some philosopher actually succeeds in constructing a credible theory of the normativity of 'rational requirements'. There would then be an intelligible sense in which Max ought to go to the empty kitchen cupboard. But it would be a further question whether that sense can plausibly be seen to play any role in our ordinary understanding of the explanatory link between Max's belief and his intentional action. The truth of the philosophical theory would not be sufficient for that. Rather its content would have to be in some way available to commonsense psychology. Otherwise it could hardly illuminate what renders the connection between the belief and action intelligible to us. A theory that might otherwise look promising may still fall at this hurdle.
Conclusion
Let us retrace the dialectic. Anscombe's 'fundamental scene', I argued in section 2, lends support to a pluralist view of the rational intelligibility of intentional actions.
Sometimes your action makes sense simply in the light of the considerations that provide good reason for it. In other cases we can only make sense of an action from a more detached point of view, in terms of what you thought was to be said in favour of it. Now a two-concept theorist might concede that pluralism is an appealing picture of folk psychology, but insist that there are philosophical reasons to insist on a uniform analysis of the intelligibility of intentional actions in terms of 'motivating reasons'.
Disjunctivism then entered the scene as a way of blocking that line of argument, by denying that 'motivating reasons', as conceived by the two-concept theorist, are independently intelligible.
But disjunctivism also bears on the question raised at the very beginning, regarding the significance of Anscombe's 'fundamental scene'. It suggests a way to understand the rationale of seeking the agent's view of what makes her action intelligible. It is not that the agent enjoys first-person authority, as this is standardly conceived in the literature. After all, far from being the last word, her account will often prompt challenges and arguments. Rather, the agent's view matters because a basic question we face in trying to understand intentional actions is whether we can share her view.
